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POLICY BRIEF
Efects of Unemployment
Insurance Reforms in Brazil
Christopher J. O’Leary, Túlio Cravo, Ana Cristina Sierra, and Leandro Justino Veloso
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n The Brazilian unemployment
insurance (UI) program, established
in 1990, is now the largest in Latin
America.
n UI reforms in 2015 increased work
experience eligibility requirements for
first- and second-time UI applicants.
n Using program administrative
data to count the number of prior
UI spells, we estimate the reforms
reduced layoffs, but by a smaller
margin than found in earlier studies.
n We find reductions in layoffs are
greater for workers with one prior UI
spell than for first-time claimants.
n The reforms also reduced the
likelihood separated workers were
recalled to their prior employer,
consistent with less employer-worker
collusion to collect UI benefits.

For additional details, see the working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/318/.

T
he Brazilian unemployment insurance (UI) program was established in response
to a severe economic recession in the 1980s. It is now the largest UI program in the

Latin America and Caribbean region, with more than 40 million benefciaries between
2012 and 2016. Despite its size, the program operates in a labor market where more
than one-third of all employees work in informal jobs not covered by UI. Because these
latter workers receive no benefts when they are separated from their jobs, formal sector
employment is desirable, and previous research has found signifcant fows of workers
between the formal and informal sectors and back again, which UI receipt may facilitate.
In particular, some employers may use UI to subsidize wages of workers they lay of
and then recall afer UI benefts end. Some laid-of employees even continue to work
informally in their prior jobs while receiving UI benefts (Van Doornik, Schoenherr,
and Skrastins 2017). Moreover, the UI program has historically been generous in terms
of minimal eligibility requirements within the formal sector, which could further
incentivize such back-and-forth fows.
Tese features have made Brazil’s UI program relatively expensive, and when a
recession in 2014 further increased costs, the Brazilian government instituted reforms
in the eligibility rules to contain future costs. We investigate the efects of two such
changes in UI eligibility rules in 2015 that increased the work experience requirements
for frst- and second-time UI applicants. While previous research estimated that these
reforms signifcantly reduced layofs (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita 2018), our analysis,
which relies on more complete administrative records, fnds smaller overall reductions in
layofs, with somewhat larger decreases for workers with a single prior UI beneft spell.

A Natural Experiment

Te recession that began in early 2014, coupled with the institutional features of
Brazil’s UI program described above, led to calls for reforming the system. Facing
general budget difculties and anticipating a signifcant rise in unemployment, Brazilian
President Dilma Roussef issued Provisional Measure 665 in late December of 2014,
raising UI eligibility requirements for frst- and second time-UI claimants, efective
March 1, 2015. Soon thereafer, the legislature passed a new law codifying eligibility rules
nearly as strict as the provisional measure, and this law took efect on June 17, 2015.
Brazil thus experienced two sudden changes in UI eligibility rules in 2015, although
these changes applied only for workers on their frst or second UI application; rules for
the third and subsequent applications were unchanged. Consequently, the reforms were
targeted toward recent labor market entrants.
Specifcally, the reforms increased the minimum number of months of employment
workers needed before they would qualify for the shortest beneft duration on their frst
or second UI application. Prior to the frst reform, any UI applicant who had worked 6
months in the prior three years could qualify for three months of benefts (frst row of
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Program costs rose
sharply with the recession
starting in 2014 as more
unemployed workers with
sufcient experience drew
UI benefts.

Table 1 Months of Employment Required for UI Benefts, 1990–2017
Number of
UI claim

Potential
beneft duration

Law 7.998
(1990 to Feb. 27,
2015)

Three
Four
Five
Three
Four
Five
Three
Four
Five

6
12
24
6
12
24
6
12
24

First

Second

Third or more

PM 665
(Feb. 28, 2015 to
Law 13.134
June 16, 2015) (from June 17, 2015)
18
24
12
24
6
12
24

12
24
9
12
24
6
12
24

NOTE: The table shows the number of months of formal employment required in the 36 months before UI
application to be eligible for benefts, by number of UI claims and regime.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from provisions in Law 7.998, PM 665, and Law 13.134.

Table 1). Under both reforms, frst- and second-time UI applicants now needed longer
recent work experience to qualify for the shortest potential beneft duration. For frsttime claimants, for example, the new minimum potential beneft shifed from 3 to 4
months, but the required work period increased from 12 to 18 months under the frst
reform, before returning to 12 months under the second reform, a mere 4 months later. A
summary of the work requirements for UI beneft eligibility under each set of eligibility
rules is listed in Table 1.
Our evaluation focuses on short-tenure workers who were most afected by the
changes in UI eligibility rules. Using data that contains tenure at the daily level, we
contrast job layof rates for a treatment group of workers with at least 6 and less than 7
months of job tenure against a control group of workers with at least 5 and less than 6
months of job tenure. Under the initial regime, the treatment group with 6 months of
job tenure was eligible for 3 months of UI benefts but frst- and second-time applicants
became ineligible for any benefts under both reforms. We estimate how diferences in
layof risk between the treatment and control groups vary across the diferent regimes, an
approach called diference-in-diferences. To isolate the impact of the reforms, we further
adjust for diferences across individuals in their geographic location, calendar month in
the data, and demographic characteristics.
Efects on Layofs

We fnd that the increase in work months needed for UI eligibility reduced employer
layofs. For short-tenure workers with no prior UI applications, the frst reform reduced
layof risk by 0.18 percentage points (from a base layof rate of 3.4 percent). Te impact of
the second reform was larger, cutting layof risk by 0.41 percentage points relative to the
period before either reform.
Among workers who had one prior UI application, the reforms had even stronger
impacts, with the frst reform reducing layof risk by 0.9 percentage points (from a base
layof rate of 4.0 percent), and the second reform by 1.05 percentage points.
While sizable, these efects are smaller than those implied by earlier studies that did
not have as detailed data on the number of prior UI applications. When we approximate
the methodology of previous studies by not accounting for the number of prior UI spells,
we estimate a layof reduction from the frst reform of 0.35 percentage points, much
smaller than earlier estimates of 0.53 percentage points (Van Doornik et al. 2018) to 0.69
percentage points (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita 2018).
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Figure 1 Both Eligibility Reforms Reduced the Risk of Layofs

Impact on probability of layoﬀs
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Reduction in Collusion

In the United States, UI benefts are fnanced by experience-rated employer taxes that
rise with total benefts paid to an employer’s former workers. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
layofs are lower in states where UI taxes rise more quickly with experience-rating (Card
and Levine 1994). In contrast, Brazilian UI benefts are fnanced from general revenues,
and neither employers nor workers pay specifc taxes to fnance the program. Consistent
with this lack of implicit penalty for heavily using the system, Brazilian UI benefts
appear to subsidize the fow between low-wage, short-term jobs and informal sector
jobs, in some cases back and forth with the same employer (Doornik, Schoenherr, and
Skrastins 2017).
We fnd the eligibility reforms afected this behavior, too. For short-tenure workers
with no prior UI claims, the probability of being rehired by the same employer within
4 to 10 months of layof fell by 1.3 percentage points afer the frst reform and 1.8
percentage points afer the second reform. For short-tenure workers with one prior UI
Figure 2 Both Eligibility Reforms Also Reduced Job Recall to the Same Employer
0
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applicants now needed
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Brazilian UI benefts
appear to subsidize the
fow between low-wage,
short-term jobs and
informal sector jobs, in
some cases back and forth
with the same employer.

claim, the frst reform reduced recall to the same employer by 1.7 percentage points, an
amount similar to workers with no prior UI claims. However, the second reform did not
appear to afect recalls for these workers.
Conclusion

We confrm results of previous research that Brazil’s 2015 increases in UI
eligibility requirements reduced layofs. However, our results indicate that previous
studies overestimated these reductions, likely because they were unable to precisely
measure individuals’ prior UI requests, a key parameter undergirding the changes
in requirements. When we account for prior UI requests, we fnd that changes in UI
eligibility rules reduced the chance of layof the most for workers with exactly one
prior UI beneft receipt spell. Our results provide some evidence that restrictions on
UI eligibility reduced collusion between workers and employers using UI benefts to
subsidize wages.
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